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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RETROACTIVE TRUSTEE
COMPENSATION STATUTES IN PENNSYLVANIA
Changes in Pennsylvania trustee compensation statutes have raised
two questions regarding the constitutionality of their retroactive application. First, whether a life tenant's right to the trust income would be
unconstitutionally infringed if the trust corpus, and thereby the trust income, were reduced by the award of a principal commission to a trustee
earlier than would have been permitted under the case law existing when
the trust was established. Second, whether the remainderman's right to
the trust corpus would be unconstitutionally infringed by the award of a
second principal commission to an executor-trustee who had received one
"full" principal commission before the repeal:' of a statute limiting him to
2
a single commission on the principal of a trust estate.
Under the repealed statute, the single commission which an executortrustee was permitted to collect on the principal of a trust estate was
awarded to him at the executor's accounting. 3 It was computed with
reference to his future duties as trustee as well as his past duties as
executor.4 Thus a part of the executor-trustee's compensation was paid in
advance of his duties as a trustee. In the future he could expect to receive
only a moderate commission on trust income. 5 In contrast, a trustee who
was not also an executor was required by case law to wait for his commission on the principal of the trust until the termination of either the
1 Pa. Laws 1945, No. 90.

Pa. Laws 1917, No. 193, § 45:
In all cases when the same person shall, under a will, fulfill the duties of
executor and trustee, it shall not be lawful for such person to receive or
charge more than one commission upon any sum of money coming into or
passing through his hands, or held by him for the benefit of other parties;
2

and such single commission shall be deemed a full compensation for his
services in the double capacity of executor and trustee: Provided, That any
such trustee shall be allowed to retain a reasonable commission on the income
he may receive from any estate held by him in trust as aforesaid.
3 Middleton's Estate, 66 Pa. Super. 55, 61-62 (1917); Milliken's Estate, 36 Pa.
County Ct. 187, 189-90 (Schuylkill County Orphans' Ct. 1909); Moore's Estate, 13
Pa. Dist. 137, 140 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1904), aff'd, 211 Pa. 343, 60 Atl. 989
(1905). Whether an election not to request the principal commission at the executor's
accounting would have constituted an implied waiver is a close question. Probably
it would not. See Coulter Estate, 379 Pa. 209, 108 A.2d 681 (1954) ; Van Storch
Estate, 88 Pa. Super. 43 (1926). But see Scull's Estate, 249 Pa. 57, 61, 94 Atl. 476,
477 (1915); Horwitz Estate, 7 Pa. Dist 179 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct 1898)
(dictum). The practice of requesting the principal commission at the executor's
accounting was so well established, however, that no election in the true sense of that
word could be said to occur.
4 See, e.g., Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 295, 198 AtI. 85, 91 (1938) ; Middleton's
Estate, 66 Pa. Super. 55, 61-62 (1917); Rogers's Estate, 17 W.N.C. 29, 30 (Philadelphia, Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1885); Barclay's Estate, 2 W.N.C. 447, 448 (Philadelphia,
Pa. Orphans' Ct 1876).
G This was usually 5% of the annual income. 1 HUNTER, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT COMMONPLACE

Boox 270 (2d ed. 1959).
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trust or his relation to the trust.6 A large part of his compensation was
therefore postponed until all his duties were completed. In the meantime
he collected the same moderate commission on trust income as did the
executor-trustee.
Neither rule proved satisfactory. Trustees complained because their
commissions on principal were postponed. Frequently an individual, as
opposed to a corporate, trustee failed to outlive the trust, so that his principal commission was not awarded until after his death.7 Executortrustees, on the other hand, were dissatisfied because their principal commission seemed inadequate in retrospect. Furthermore, the payment of a
large sum in a single year had unhappy tax consequences for both trustees
and executor-trustees.
Against this background, the Pennsylvania legislature in 1945 repealed
the statute limiting executor-trustees to a single principal commission.8
Corporate fiduciaries advocated changes in the case law, particularly the
introduction of a "pay as you go" system of periodic compensation from
principal to match the regular commissions on incomef In Williamson
Estate,10 a test case brought in 1951, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
admitted that a reform of the rules governing trustee compensation might
be desirable, but suggested that the matter was properly one for the legislature.'1 The court declined to overrule the case law prohibiting the
payment of a principal commission to a trustee before either the termination of the trust or his relation to the trust.12 In the alternative the court
held that the payment of a second principal commission to the executortrustee, who had accepted the trust and been paid a "full" principal commission before repeal, would infringe upon the remainderman's right to
the trust corpus in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. 13 In 1953, not long after Williamson, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a statute which provided:
6 Snyder Estate, 346 Pa. 615, 622-23, 31 A.2d 132, 136 (1943); Bosler's Estate,
161 Pa. 457, 462-67, 29 Atl. 57, 60-62 (1894) (per curiam).
7

See Williamson Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 230, 232-33 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct.

1950), aff'd, 368 Pa. 343, 82 A.2d 49 (1951).
8 Pa. Laws 1945, No. 90 (repealing Pa. Laws 1917, No. 193, § 45).
9 See Williamson Estate, 368 Pa. 343, 348, 82 A.2d 49, 52 (1951); 86 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 46 (1948) ; 84 TRUSTS & ESTATES 84 (1947).
10 368 Pa. 343, 82 A.2d 49 (1951).
112 Id. at 352, 82 A.2d at 54.
1 Id. at 350-52, 82 A.2d at 53-54.
13 Id. at 352-53, 82 A.2d at 54. The case involved both issues since the executortrustee had received a "full" principal commission at the executor's accounting and
was requesting a second principal commission before the termination of the trust.
The lower court refused the request solely because the trust had not yet terminated.

Williamson Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 230 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct.), aff'd, 368 Pa.

343, 82 A.2d 49 (1951). The supreme court asked for briefs and reargument on the
question of whether a second principal commission would be constitutional. The
decision to refuse the fiduciary's request for a principal commission could have been
sustained independently for either of these two reasons.
On the constitutional question, neither Williamson nor later cases refer to PA.
CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 9, whose language is substantially similar to U.S. CoNsT. amend.

XIV, § 1.
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Section 1. Neither the fact that a fiduciary's service has not
ended nor the fact that the trust has not ended shall be a bar to
the fiduciary's receiving compensation for his services out of the
principal of a trust.
Section 2. Whenever it shall appear either during the continuance of a trust or at its end, that a fiduciary has rendered services
for which he has not been fully compensated, the court having
jurisdiction over his accounts shall allow him such original or
additional compensation out of the trust income or the trust
principal or both, as may be necessary to compensate him for
the services theretofore rendered by him.
Section 5. This act shall apply:
(1)

To all services heretofore rendered by any fiduciary;

(2) To all services hereafter rendered by any fiduciary
heretofore appointed;
Section 6. If the Constitution of the United States or of this
Commonwealth prevents the application of this act to services
falling in one or more of the four categories listed in section 5
hereof, the act shall nevertheless apply to services falling in the
other categories or category. 14

Thereafter, lower courts awarded interim principal commissions to trustees
who would previously have been required to wait until the termination
of the trust.' 5 But in Scott Estate,'0 where an executor-trustee who had
received a principal commission before the repeal applied for a second
principal commission on the authority of section 2 of the new statute, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed its decision in Williamson and held
that such an award would unconstitutionally infringe upon the remainderman's right to the trust corpus.
The majority of the court in Williamson had argued that when the
trust was accepted and the first principal commission awarded, an implied

§§ 3274, 3275, 3278(1) (2), 3279 (1964).
15Rea Trust, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 433 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. 1962);
Colton Estate, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 538 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. 1957);
Mifflin Trust, 4 Fiduciary Rep. 275 (Philadelphia, Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1954) ; Stotesbury
Estate, 85 Pa. D. & C. 551 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. 1953), rev'd on other
grounds, 387 Pa. 591 (1957).
16418 Pa. 332, 211 A.?d 429 (1965). The fiduciaries in Scott argued that reference to the constitutional issue in Williamson had been dicta. In view of the fact
that the Williamson court had asked for separate briefs and reargument on the issue,
the statement certainly had none of the weaknesses of dictum. In any case, whether
it was dictum or an alternative holding, the court in Scott found it "persuasive and
applicable." Id. at 337-38, 211 A.2d at 432.
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
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contract was formed. -One term of this contract was that the single principal commission, in accordance with the statute then in effect, would be
in full compensation for the executor-trustee's past and future services.
Under this implied contract, the Williamson opinion concluded, the remainderman had a vested right to the trust principal which would be
unconstitutionally infringed by the award of a second principal commission.'1 A separate opinion in Williamson,'8 filed by Justice Bell, answered
that if any implied contract were formed, it was one providing that the
executor-trustee would be paid reasonable and just compensation for his
services.1 9 He concluded that no vested right would be infringed by the
award of a second principal commission if one were necessary to compensate the fiduciary adequately for the services rendered subsequent to
20

the repeal.

Both the majority opinion in Williamson and the separate opinion by
Justice Bell do little more than assert their conclusions that a vested right
will or will not be infringed by allowing a second commission on principal.
The label "vested" is not itself an explanation. Its only definition in this
context is that a right so labeled is constitutionally protected from infringement by a retroactive law; 21 thus to say that a law may not be applied
retroactively because it infringes a vested right is circular. Nor does the
introduction of an implied contract contribute to an analysis of the constitutional problem. An interest is not protected from the operation of a
22
retroactive law simply because it is associated with a contract.
Since a number of jurisdictions have upheld the constitutionality of
retroactive trustee compensation statutes,23 it is important to determine
whether the decisions in Williamson and Scott were correct, and whether
the constitutional argument for allowing interim principal commissions
on trusts established under the terminal principal commission rule depends
on the same, or different, considerations.
Basic to the constitutional question is a determination of the intent
of the 1953 statute. Clearly the legislature intended that interim principal
17 368 Pa. at 352, 82 A.2d at 54.
8
Id. at 353, 82 A.2d at 54.
19 Id. at 360, 82 A.2d at 58.
20
Ibid. Justice Bell concluded that the repeal was intended to be prospective
only, but argued that the provision in the repealing act that it should take effect
immediately showed an intent to apply it to services rendered after the repeal. He
then reached the issue of whether, before the repeal, the remainderman had acquired
a right to receive services rendered after the repeal without additional charge which
would be unconstitutionally infringed by the award of a second principal commission.
He concluded that the remainderman had no such right.
212 AusnN, JURISPRUDENcE 256 (Campbell ed. 1875); B. Smith, Retroactive
Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEXAS L. REv. 231, 245-48 (1927).
22 See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) ; Hale,
The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III, 57 HARv. L. REv. 852, 872-92
(1944).
23
E.g., Estate of Franklin, 47 Cal. 2d 303, 303 P.2d 339 (1956) (per curiam);
In re Donovan's Estate, 266 Mich. 362, 253 N.W. 552 (1934) ; Robertson v. DeBrulatour, 188 N.Y. 301, 80 N.E. 938 (1907).
1
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commissions should be allowed on trusts established before its enactment.
There is, however, some doubt that the legislature intended to authorize
the payment of second principal commissions to executor-trustees who
had collected one before repeal of the statute limiting them to a single
commission on principal. The 1945 repealing act itself did not clearly
indicate an intent to disturb interests previously settled by the payment of
a "full" principal commission.24 The remainderman in Scott argued that
section 2 of the 1953 statute was directed solely to interim principal commissions and did not refer to executor-trustees who had collected a principal commission under the repealed statute. This construction is plausible.
The new statute authorizes additional compensation when it appears that
the fiduciary has rendered services "for which he has not been fully compensated ....
," 25 Under the language of the repealed statute, the
executor-trustee's first principal commission was awarded "in full compensation for his services in the double capacity of executor and trustee.
) 20
The continuing reference to "fullness" may indicate a statutory
word of art, to be distinguished from "adequate." Nothing else in the
statute compels a conclusion that previously paid "full" commissions should
be redetermined.
In both Scott and Williamson, however, the court did not rest its
decision on the legislature's failure to use compelling language. Instead
of strictly construing the retroactive statute, the court dealt directly with
the issue of whether it could constitutionally be applied to the trusts.
When a retroactive civil law abridges private interests by changing
the legal effect of events which preceded its enactment, it is frequently
challenged either as an impairment of the obligation of contracts or as a
taking of property without due process of law. Generally it is recognized
that the asserted right will be protected from infringement only if, on
balancing the purpose served by the retroactive law against the private
27
interests infringed, the law is found to be unreasonable.
The purpose of awarding a second principal commission to an executortrustee who collected one under the repealed statute presumably would be
to compensate for any inadequacy of the first, "full" principal commission.
In Williamson the corporate fiduciary presented a considerable body of
financial data and expert opinion in an attempt to prove a loss both on the
operation of its trust department as a whole and on the individual trusts
involved. A concurring opinion in the orphans' court's decision noted
that the department's profit and loss statement did not take into account
24See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §
STRuCrioN § 2044 (3d ed. 1943).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3275

26 Pa.

Laws 1917, No. 193, § 45.

596 (1952); 1

SuTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoN-

(1964).

27 Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U.L.
REv. 540, 561-63 (1956) ; Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of
Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. Rv. 692, 694-95 (1960) ; B. Smith, supra note

21, at 247-48.
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income derived from the substantial deposits of trust funds awaiting investment, and that its small loss rested on expense allocations which, if
varied a mere fraction, would have resulted in a showing of profit for
28
the department as a whole.
With respect to individual trusts, too, the inadequacy of the fiduciary's compensation can be doubted. A principal commission awarded at
the commencement of a trust is a larger percentage of the value of the
corpus than the same percentage would be if withheld until the trust terminates. Since it is paid in advance, it deprives the life tenant of the
investment income it would have produced for him, and it should produce
the same return for the fiduciary instead. Consequently, the investment
return on the commission paid to the executor-trustee should have at least
partially offset any increase in the cost of servicing the trust.
In Scott the fiduciaries did not attempt to reproduce the relevant
financial data of the type introduced fourteen years before in Williamson.
They merely reviewed the services that had been rendered the trust, indicated the inadequacy of the compensation they had received by comparing
it with current compensation for such services in other trusts, and asked
for a reasonable principal commission to supplement the first. Such a
record certainly does not establish that the first principal commission was
inadequate, much less the extent of the alleged inadequacy. At best it
creates a general impression that the fiduciaries deserve more compensation for their services.
Conceding-as did the opinion in Scott 20-that the first principal
commission "appears" to have been inadequate, the propriety of awarding
a second principal commission still depends upon the relative strength of
the policies that favor curing the compensation's inadequacy and those that
favor protecting the remainderman's interest in the trust corpus from additional charges by the trustee.
Several of the policies that could conceivably be served by curing the
inadequacy depend largely upon its extent. If it were severe enough to
endanger the continued existence of corporate fiduciary institutions, the
value of their professional services to the community would favor the
award of a second principal commission. It does not appear, however,
that corporate fiduciaries are unable to attract the capital necessary to
their continued operation. It might be argued, in favor of curing a less
severe inadequacy, that it would be desirable to do so in order to provide
an incentive to superior trust management. The result of a trustee's
stewardship is one of the acknowledged criteria in Pennsylvania for computing his compensation 3 0 But it is unlikely that a single, reasoned ex28

Williamson Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 230, 238-39 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct.
1951) (Ladner, J., concurring).
29 418 Pa. at 339, 211 A.2d at 432-33.
80
In re Ashman's Estate, 218 Pa. 509, 511-12, 67 At. 841, 842 (1907) ; Lovering
Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 501 (Philadelphia Orphans' Ct. 1962).
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ception to the general rule would defeat the incentive it provides. In any
case, it would lessen the incentive to superior management only in the excepted class. Thus the declining number of trusts created prior to the 1945
repeal of the single principal commission rule would be the only ones affected. Even then, the possibility of surcharging erring trustees should
insure an acceptable minimum standard of management.
Another possible argument for curing the inadequacy is that the trust
beneficiary will be unjustly enriched if the fiduciary is not paid the value
of his services. There is some merit in this contention. Historically, however, the fiduciary's position was honorary and it was thought contrary to
public policy to permit any compensation for his services. 31 His modern
right to compensation seems to rest on statutory enactment rather than
contract principles. This fact must be considered in weighing the force
of this argument.
The interest of the trust beneficiary that would be affected by the
award of a second principal commission is somewhat different from that
which has been affected by the retroactive trustee compensation statutes
held constitutional in other jurisdictions. The difference arises from the
fact that the retroactive statutes in other jurisdictions were applied to
services for which a court had not before determined the proper amount
of compensation,32 while in the case of the executor-trustee seeking a second
principal commission there has been a prior court determination of the
value of all the fiduciary's services and an award of that full amount. Even
where the application of new rates of compensation to established trusts
has been held constitutional, courts have occasionally recognized this distinction. They have refused to apply the new rate to services for which
compensation was granted in a past decree, usually on the theory that the
awards were res judicata.3
The Scott opinion adverts to several of the policies underlying res
judicata without using that label. The opinion states that if the court
were to allow a reconsideration of the adequacy of the first principal commission, then beneficiaries of trusts which had ended earlier than originally
expected would have a reciprocal right to challenge the reasonableness of
these past awards. This, the court suggests, would result in a spate of
litigation and would place a heavy burden on trustees to prove the cost of
services that might have been rendered years ago. The fear of burdensome litigation and the attendant difficulties of proof are themselves part
34
of the recognized rationale of res judicata.
Another reason for applying res judicata to a particular court determination is to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties that an
8

1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 975, at 278-80 (2d ed. 1962).
32 See, e.g., cases cited note 23 supra.
33

E.g., In the Matter of Barrett's Estate, 124 Misc. 699, 209 N.Y. Supp. 678
(Surr. Ct 1925).
84 Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29, 31-34 (1964).
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issue should be determined by a court only once.35 This seems to favor
making the reasonableness of the first principal commission res judicata.
When the commission was awarded at the executor's accounting, it was
intended by the court and understood by the parties to be in full satisfaction for all the executor-trustee's claims on principal for his past and
future services. The remainderman could challenge its reasonableness for
only a limited time.38 It seems that the executor-trustee should be similarly precluded from questioning the award's reasonableness. 37 The observation in Scott that if a second principal commission were awarded, then
the first should be open to challenges by trust beneficiaries who normally
would be barred from doing so, suggests that the court was thinking in
terms of res judicata.
The decisions in Scott and Williamson on the issue of second principal
commissions apparently rested on the recognized reluctance of a court to
allow infringement of a right established in a "final and unreviewable
determination." 3 8 In view of the questionable showing of inadequacy and
the lack of compelling reasons for curing it, the decisions in Williamson
and Scott seem proper.
The argument for upholding a retroactive application of the interim
principal commission statute is significantly stronger than is the case for
allowing a second principal commission where the executor-trustee has
collected a full commission under the repealed statute. The purpose of
awarding an interim principal commission is to compensate the trustee
for his services more promptly than was the practice under the terminal
principal commission rule. This change is especially advantageous to the
individual trustee, who will certainly be more willing to assume his duties
knowing that he, rather than his estate, will reap the fruits of his labor.
In the case of the retroactive interim principal commission statute, the remainderman has no standing to complain. The trustee is entitled to a
principal commission and the fact that it is paid in more than one installment would not seem to affect the total amount of the award. Nor should
the slight reduction of income resulting from the early award of a principal commission defeat any reasonable expectations of the income beneficiary, since the amount of income commissions in Pennsylvania has
always been at the discretion of the court and subject to variation.3 9 Because there has not been a final court determination of the amount of the
85Id.
at 31.
3
McKinney's Estate, 260 Pa. 123, 103 Atl. 590 (1918); Vastine's Estate, 190
Pa. 443, 42 Ati. 1038 (1899).
a7The remainderman in Scott argued that there may have been reliance on the
fact that the first commission was final. He suggested that the first award might
have been challenged within the time allotted for appeal if it were thought that a
second principal commission were possible. Brief for Appellee, p. 25.
38
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 258 U.S. 13, 22 (1922)
(dictum)
; see Hochman, supra note 27, at 718-19.
9

a Lennig's Estate, 53 Pa. Super. 596 (1913); Gelbach's Estate, 29 Pa. Super.
446 (1905).
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income commissions, the policies behind res judicata do not favor protecting the income beneficiary from such a change. Balancing the purpose
served by the retroactive interim principal commission statute against the
slight reduction of income from the trust, it seems that the law is clearly
reasonable.
The constitutionality of the retroactive interim principal commission
statute is not controlled by Scott and Williamson because, as we have seen,
different factors enter into the balancing process which determines its reasonableness. For the same reason the decisions in Scott and Williamson
are not inconsistent with the Pennsylvania decisions 40 upholding the constitutionality of the retroactive provisions of the Uniform Principal and
Income Act.41 Each case poses a unique problem.
The difficulty of predicting the outcome of a balancing test is apparent.
If it is thought that retroactive statutes in the area of trust administration
are desirable, it might be helpful for a legislature drafting such a statute to
explicitly provide that its future amendment may be given retroactive
effect. This at least will put the parties affected on notice that the legislature does not intend that any rights acquired under the statute shall be
immune from later changes in the rules of trust administration.
40

Norvell Estate, 415 Pa. 427, 203 A.2d 538 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913

(1965) ; Catherwood Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961).
41
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.15 (1964).

